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MARGINALIZED SUBJECTS, M AINSTREAM OBJECTIVES: 
INSIGHTS ON OUTSIDERS IN RECENT GERMAN FILM 
 
Uns geht es um ein genaues Erfassen von Lebenswelten und psychologisch 
nachvollziehbar erzählte Figuren. Jeder Film ist eine persönliche Sicht auf einen Aspekt, 
zusammen werden die 12 Filme der Reihe ein Bild des Wandels im Osten ergeben, das 
sonst in den Medien so nicht zu finden ist.1 
 
For those who remained unconvinced as to the merits of German unification, the acts of violence 
perpetrated against the immigrant population and against asylum seekers, which received 
considerable media interest in the early nineties, tended to confirm their suspicions that the east 
Germans not only lacked the liberal values that the west Germans had supported and upheld since 
the end of the war, but that they posed a possible threat to them. 2 The continuing support for 
extremist parties in the eastern states (in recent elections, both the Nationaldemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands (NDP) and Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) succeeded in surmounting the 5% needed 
for parliamentary representation) tends to be viewed as a sad indictment of the east Germans’ 
illiberal attitude and of their failure either to accept or support the spirit of pluralism that 
underpins a healthy democracy. The negative view of the east is encouraged not only by the high-
profile media attention usually given to any right-wing activity in the east but also by the 
imprudent comments periodically uttered by various public figures. 3 These have ensured that the 
east continues to be associated with a series of unflattering, often offensive characteristics, 
ranging from the east Germans’ alleged indolence, to their moral depravity, and their political 
radicalism (manifest in the support for fringe parties, on the left and the right). A former 
government spokesman, Uwe-Karsten Heye, for example, recently commented that non-white 
                                                               
1 Cooky Ziesche and Annedore v. Donop, ‘Ostwind Editorial’ . Provided by the television station Rundfunk Berlin-
Brandenburg (RBB). 
2 I follow the conven tion whereby any reference to the pre-unification population/state/region is referred to by using 
upper case spelling (East/West) and use lower case (east /west) when referring to the period since unification. 
3 According to Eva Kolinsky, though the East ‘took the lead in attacking foreigners, West German right-wing 
extremists soon committed more xenophobic offences’. Eva Kolinsky, ‘Non-German Minorities in Contemporary 
German Society’, Turkish Culture in German Society Today, ed. by David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky (Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 1996), pp. 71-111 (p. 104). 
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visitors would do well to avoid certain hostile eastern provinces. Although Heye later withdrew 
the comment, such remarks do little to combat the view of the east as a region defined by its 
alleged xenophobia. A multiple infanticide, which was discovered in 2005, provoked perhaps one 
of the biggest faux pas when the CDU politician, Jörg Schönbohm, implied that the murders 
bespoke a moral waywardness that was the product of East German ideology. 4 Others, such as 
the Conservative politician, Edmund Stoiber, have exploited the situation, claiming that the 
economic and social conditions in the east are reminiscent of those in Weimar Germany and 
warning of a similar outcome (remarks that were roundly criticized for scaremongering).  
The rise in right-wing politics in east German communities has been variously explained. 
Where some see the region’s parlous economic state as providing fertile ground for political 
extremism, others believe hatred of outsiders to be a legacy of the GDR, pointing to a political 
culture in which suspicion of the outsider (an ideologically constructed ‘other’) was part of 
everyday rhetoric. 5 The east Germans’ lack of contact with outsiders is another factor frequently 
cited in explaining their intolerance, for despite its proclaimed internationalism, the GDR never 
successfully integrated the few non-nationals living there, a policy of exclusion that resulted in a 
state that was essentially ‘ausländerrein’.6 
Of course, right-wing extremism is not a problem confined to Germany’s eastern 
territories: racially motivated attacks have also taken place in the west, and far right parties enjoy 
some support in western constituencies.  Fearing the damage it would do to the country’s 
reputation shortly before the 2006 World Cup tournament, the police forbade the NDP from 
marching in the west German town of Gelsenkirchen. Despite the existence of a violent right-
                                                               
4 See Otto Köhler, ‘Heiliger Georg kämpft gegen ostdeutschen Lindwurm’, Freitag 32, 12.8.2005. Online at: 
http://www.freitag.de/2005/32/05320402.php [Accessed 10.7.2006]. 
5 See Hermann Kurthen and Michael Minkenberg, ‘Germany in Transition: Immigration, Racism and the Extreme 
Right’, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1995), 175-196. 
6 Kolinsky, p. 86. Kolinsky gives this some historical context when she says that ‘the status of non-German 
minorities had hardly changed and fewer foreign nationals than in 1939 lived in the territory which had been the 
GDR.’ p. 72. See also Bill Niven’s summary of explanations in his Facing the Nazi Past: United Germany and the 
Legacy of the Third Reich (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 238. See, too, Kathrin Hörschelmann’s discussion of the 
media’s narrow focus when it comes to reporting and researching east German neo-fascism: ‘Deviant Masculinities: 
Representations of Neo-Fascist Youth in Eastern Germany’, in Spaces of Masculinities, ed. by Bettina van Hoven 
and Kathrin Hörschelmann (Oxford: Routledge, 2005), pp. 138-152. 
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wing scene in the west, the incidents in the east appear to attract greater attention. No data yet 
exist for us to gauge whether the media give equal coverage to offences committed in east and 
west, but certainly the feeling among many east Germans is that local crimes are given undue 
attention by the national media. According to Kathrin Hörschelmann, who conducted research 
into audience interpretations of east German representations, (east German) respondents 
generally felt that the media tends to place ‘the former east at the margin of (post)unifica tion 
society, while reinforcing notions of western superiority.’7 The eastern interviewees hoped 
eventually to see programmes that would ‘depict their lives from a wide range of perspectives, 
but which also interrogate the effects of political and economic conditions on east Germany’s 
inclusion/exclusion, rather than drawing on stereotypes as quasi-explanations.’8 Surveys 
routinely confirm that the east Germans feel they are treated as second class citizens.9 There are 
myriad factors to consider when seeking an explanation of this, of course - the eastern states’ 
poor economic performance, the east Germans’ lack of representation in elite positions (with the 
exception of the current Chancellor: there are few of Angela Merkel’s compatriots in positions of 
power), the material condition of the region, the disparate salaries. Given that media culture is 
generally held to constitute the ‘dominant force of socialization’ in contemporary society, it 
would not be unreasonable to suggest that the media representation may have contributed to the 
east Germans’ unease about their status, which they perceive as being lower even tha n that of 
‘Giuseppe and Achmed’ (a reference to the two most established immigrant groups in Germany)  
as Peter, one of the characters in Hannes Stöhr’s Berlin is in Germany (2001) notes.10 
                                                               
7 Kathrin Hörschelmann, ‘Audience Interpretations of (former) East Germany’s Representation in the German 
Media’, European Urban and Regional Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2001), 189-202 (p. 192). 
8 Ibid., p. 199. 
9 See Wolfram Brunner’s and Dieter Walz’s assessment of the east Germans’ perceived second-class status, 
‘Selbstidentifikation er Ostdeutschen 1990-1997. Warum sich die Ostdeutschen als ‘Bürger 2. Klasse’ fühlen, wir 
aber nicht auf die ‘innere Mauer’ treffen’, in Werte und nationale Identität im vereinten Deutschland, ed. by Heimer 
Meulemann (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1998), pp. 229-250. The phrase was previously used in reference to West 
Germany’s labour migrants. See, for example, Haris Katsoulis, Bürger Zweiter Klasse. Ausländer in der 
Bundesrepublik  (Berlin: Express Edition GmbH, 1984). 
10 Douglas Kellner, Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics between the Modern and the Postmodern  
(London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 17. I do not think the character’s indignation is intended to indicate a 
racist attitude – he and his friends later confront local neo-Nazis. Yet, for other east Germans their lowly status is all 
the more humiliating because it is measured against that of other minorities who, the implication goes, should expect 
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Despite some legitimate grievances, the east Germans cannot claim to be as 
disenfranchised as the German-Turks – or indeed any of the other minority groups living in 
Germany. The east Germans may often feel that they have had to endure countless indignities as 
a result of policies drawn up by west German administrators, but their automatic membership of 
the Federal Republic was never in question, a privilege long withheld from other minority groups 
in Germany. It took a change of government and several years of constitutional and political 
wrangling for Germany’s archaic immigration laws to be modernized, resulting in the citizenship 
law of 2000, which, following the principle of ius solis rather than ius sanguinis, finally granted 
citizenship and accompanying rights to thousands of German-Turks resident in Germany (though 
the rights of citizenship were dependent on certain conditions including, for example, the legal 
resident status of the parent).11 But though the  Turks are undoubtedly among the most socially 
disadvantaged groups in Germany – Horrocks and Kolinsky have suggested that ‘Turks appear to 
draw the short straw and are less likely than other minorities to benefit from avenues of 
acceptance and social opportunity’ – the real hurdles that they must surmount (in terms of 
political representation, disappointing educational achievement, violent xenophobia) do little to 
contextualize or lessen the east Germans’ own sense of injustice, however inflated that might 
be.12 ‘Social exclusion is’, as Kolinsky notes, ‘defined as the gap between reality and expectation, 
and constitutes a subjective category. Perception of disadvantage, however, may be as forceful a 
social and political motivation as objectively measured disadvantage.’ [my emphasis]13  
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
no better. One of the east Germans interviewed by Robin Ostow, for example, complains that when west German 
entrepreneurs arrived, ‘“they opened stores in which they treated us like Turks.’” See Robin Ostow, “‘Ne Art 
Burgerwehr in Form von Skins”: Young Germans on the Streets in the Eastern and Western States of the Federal 
Republic’, New German Critique , No. 64 (Winter 1995), 87-103 (p. 94). See also David Morley’s discussion of this 
issue in Home Territories: Media, Mobility and Identity (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 167-170. 
11 See Lydia Morris, ‘Rights and Controls in the Management of Migration: The Case of Germany’, The Sociological 
Review, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2000), 224-240. See also Simon Green’s useful discussion of citizenship laws, ‘Between 
Ideology and Pragmatism: The Politics of Dual Nationality in Germany’, International Migration Review, Vol. 39, 
No. 4, Winter (2005), 1-31. 
12 David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky, ‘Introduction: Migrants or Citizens? Turks in Germany between Exclusion and 
Acceptance’, in Horrocks and Kolinsky, pp. x-xxvii (p. xxiv). 
13 Kolinsky, p. 100. One could also draw a comparison between some west Germans’ reception to labour migrants 
and the attitude of some west Germans to their eastern compatriots. Klusmeyer’s observation that ‘during the 1950s, 
the differences that marked the refugees and expellees made them seem dangerously “foreign” in the eyes of many 
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The imagined east German community 
 
This article addresses the ways filmmakers have recently gone about challenging the dominant 
modes of representation of east Germans and eastern Germany. I will focus specifically on the 
final films produced as part of the Ostwind series, a unique collaboration between the national 
public service broadcaster, Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF) and the regional east German 
channel Ostdeutscher Rundfunk (ORB). 14 However, before considering the commissioning 
editors’ claim that the films made under their remit are unique in their representation of the east, 
it may be useful to offer a necessarily brief summary of the different approaches to representing 
east Germany since unification. 
After 1989, mainstream depictions of east Germans offered the region as an amusingly 
backward region populated by an appealingly primitive people, who were frequently confused 
and intimidated by their experiences of the west. Though their naivety made them easy prey for 
west German profiteers, these unsophisticated east Germans challenged the new administration 
(as represented by bankers, politicians, civil servants), with the provincial underdogs usually able 
to triumph over their would-be colonizers. These representations were largely sympathetic, if not 
a little patronizing (and would have been unthinkable if applied to other minority groups), and 
bore little relation to the realities of life in Germany at that time.15 While television reports from 
the east routinely documented the region’s failings, ranging from the alarming environmental 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
native inhabitants, who routinely criticised their unwillingness to work, their general uncleanliness, their proneness 
to criminality, and their lack of gratitude’ is strikingly similar to comments often directed at east Germans. See 
Douglas Klusmeyer, ‘A “Guiding Culture” for Immigrants? Integration and Diversity in Germany’, Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2001), 519-523 (p. 527). See also Toralf Staud , ‘Ossis sind Türken. 13 
Jahre Einheit: In Gesamt-Westdeutschland sind die Ostdeutschen Einwanderer’, Die Zeit, 02.10.2003, Nr.41. Online 
at: http://www.zeit.de/2003/41/Einwanderer [Accessed 23.6.2006]. Also see Wolf Wagner, ‘Das Quasi-Volk. Stand 
der Einheit. Die Ethnisierung der Deutschen nimmt zu ’, Freitag, 22. 26.5.2000. Online at: 
http://www.freitag.de/2000/22/00220101.htm [Accessed 23.6.2006]. 
14 The series was originally between ZDF and Ostdeutscher Rundfunk (ORB), which later merged with Sender Freies 
Berlin (SFB), becoming RBB in 2003. It also co-operated with the prominent film school, ‘Hochschule für Film und 
Fernsehen, ‘Konrad Wolf’’ in Potsdam.  
15 See Hörschelmann (2001), whose interviewees confirmed that these assumed characteristics were prevalent, too, in 
other media representations. See p. 195 
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damage to the equally alarming violent racism, audiences were flocking to see sentimental 
comedies such as Go, Trabi, Go (Peter Timm, 1990). These films capitalized on, and perhaps 
hoped to prolong, the early euphoria that followed the state’s collapse. Any reference to post-
unification tension – the challenge of system transformation, racism, unemployment, ecological 
disaster – was usually played for laughs. At a time when German society was undergoing the 
most dramatic changes in almost half a century, many commercial filmmakers were thus content 
with exploiting the comic possibilities that the encounters between east and west offered. The 
conflict that arose between the populations east and west of the former border may have been the 
source of genuine antagonism, but it was invariably presented as a dialectic of global enterprise 
(predatory west Germans representing corporate interests) and local industry (represented by 
vulnerable east Germans), which lack of specificity accounts for the films’ popularity in the west.  
Providing a balance to these mainstream comic accounts of life in the east were several 
dozen, low-budget films which performed a critical dissection of the Wende. These narratives 
addressed the economic and social realities facing the east German community, usually providing 
a critique of both the GDR and the FRG. The majority of the films searched out places and 
locations unfamiliar to most German audiences and focused on provincial communities that had 
ruptured since unification. Where the mainstream films situated their narratives in the region’s 
picturesque locations, it is the barren fields, abandoned homesteads and derelict industrial 
premises that provide a standard backdrop for these bleak accounts. The east Germans’ 
apparently innate provincialism, which in the mainstream films had indulged a nostalgia for a 
pre-modern Germany, was often inverted so that the east Germans’ lack of sophistication was no 
longer old- fashioned or charming, but an indication of backwardness, a way of thinking and 
behaving that prevented the population from rising to the challenges of a modern German society. 
Unlike the mainstream comedies, individuals found no solace among members of their own 
community. What did unite individuals in these social-critical narratives was a mutual fear of 
outsiders, one that was often articulated using the vocabulary of the far right, and the east 
Germans’ alleged propensity for violence and discrimination was one of several recurring topoi 
in many of the films made in the nineties. The narratives ultimately highlighted the inhabitants’ 
limited options and marginalized existences, exposing the post-unification rhetoric of integration, 
opportunity and parity as political cant. 
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Perhaps the most significant development in the depiction of east Germans was the 
emergence of the nostalgia film which came to prominence in the late nineties. The Ostalgie  
films challenged the dominant practices of representation, both the cheery condescension of the 
early comedies and the gloomy outlook of the period’s social dramas.16 Profiting from the east 
Germans’ new-found interest for used east German culture, which had contributed to the 
articulation of a separate cultural identity, these films celebrated aspects of life in the GDR in a 
way that would have been unimaginable some years earlier. Not surprisingly, there has been 
considerable debate among scholars and commentators as to whether the nostalgic narratives are, 
as some would have it, revisionist accounts of life in the GDR or, as others claim, a harmless 
celebration of life under socialism, which enables east Germans to protect their experiences and 
memories from the western version of events.17  
The Ostalgie trend is rela ted to the east Germans’ perception of disadvantage. The failure 
fully to integrate minority groups in a host culture exacerbates feelings of exclusion and 
inevitably promotes a reassessment and reassertion of the culture of origin, and is by no means 
uniq ue to the east Germans. Feeling that they are somehow barred from full integration with west 
German society (or at least that access to similar levels of prosperity has been unjustly deferred), 
they have set about preserving their cultural distinctiveness, a process that is viewed as a 
provocation and an insult by some Germans. It would be incorrect to see the east Germans’ 
reappraisal of life under socialism as an attempt to forge a wholly separate identity or as a rude 
rejection of democratic values. They may routinely distinguish themselves as east German, but 
they also recognize their attachment to a pan-German culture, a hyphenated identity not 
dissimilar to developments among other minority groups who move between mainstream German 
culture and the culture of origin - be it Turkish, Kosovan, or Vietnamese. The attempted 
promulgation of separate identities is often viewed with some suspicion by members of the host 
culture. One of the persistent allegations made against foreigners in Germany, according to 
                                                               
16 A neologism that combines ‘Nostalgie’ (nostalgia) and ‘Ost’ (east). 
17 These three different approaches broadly correspond with the sociologist Rolf Reißig’s claim that there have been 
three distinct stages in the east Germans’ response to their changed socio-economic environment, which he defines 
as ‘Einheitseuphorie’, ‘Transformations- und Einheitsschock’, and ‘Ankommen und Distanz’. See Rolf Reißig, 
‘Ostdeutschland: Am Ende des Systemwechsels - am Anfang einer nachhaltigen Transformation’, BISS public, 
Beiträge zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Diskussion , No. 26, Halbjahresband II/1998.  Online at: http://www.biss-
online.de/htm_beitraege/BISS%20pub%20Heft%2026.htm [Accessed 17.4.2005]. 
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Kolinsky, ‘concerns their alleged distance from mainstream German culture and their lack of 
willingness to integrate’.18 Symbols of obvious cultural difference may be regarded as a wilful 
rejection of their values. The more obvious the cultural signifier, the stronger is usually the 
reaction. The Muslim headscarf, the hijab, which prompted heated debate in several European 
countries, including Germany, is such an example.19 Some east Germans’ decision to wear old 
Party shirts and insignia is doubtless more of a provocation, but the effect is not dissimilar 
(although this does not suggest that the east Germans are likely to sympathize with outward 
displays of difference among other minority groups).  
Recent years have seen politicians, generally conservatives, demanding that minority 
communities integrate more closely with their host community. While the conservatives’ 
proposed Leitkultur policy was widely dismissed when it was first outlined in 2000, the call for 
greater participation by (ethnic) minorities and  for cultural assimilation has grown in urgency 
since 9/11, albeit without the chauvinistic overtones inherent in the CDU’s proposition. 20 East 
Germans have likewise been urged to abandon their culture (where this is seen as the product of a 
socialist dictatorship) and to demonstrate greater commitment to German democracy. For some 
commentators, the celebration of GDR culture was an affront to Germany’s democratic 
sensibilities, and the nostalgic revival that first began in the mid-nineties and which has 
continued through various manifestations and permutations was interpreted as revisionism. What 
these commentators failed to recognize was that that this performative nostalgia often signalled 
an ironic take on the past rather than any genuine commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology; only 
very few are likely to have donned official dress as a way of demonstrating their loyalty to the 
East German regime. Other commentators, such as Slavoj Zizek, have suggested that, ‘Ostalgie 
for the defunct Socialism mostly consists in such a conservative nostalgia for the self-satisfied 
constrained way of life’, though this fails to explain adequately Ostalgie’s appeal amongst the 
                                                               
18 Kolinsky, p.93. 
19 See Veysel Oezcan, ‘Germany’s High Court Allows Teacher to Wear Muslim Headscarf’, Migration Information 
Source, 1.11.2003. Online at: http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=175 [Accessed 
9.2.2006]. 
20 The principles behind the ‘Leitkultur’ proposal have been echoed in other countries. Consider, for example, Lord 
Tebbit’s ‘cricket test’, which would apparently establish whether or not a minority community had successfully 
integrated with their host culture. For more on the ‘Leitkultur’, see Klusmeyer. 
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young, for whom mementoes from the GDR function as fashion rather than political statements 
(though the two are not incompatible).21  
Despite Ostalgie’s commercial significance and its appeal across generations and regions, 
it should not be viewed only in terms of its profitability or as a postmodern trend that has seen the 
kitsch commodification of communism. The east Germans’ nostalgia for particular aspects of the 
past was undoubtedly a response to the dissatisfactions of the present. One of the major 
frustrations for east Germans was the feeling that they were no longer able to narrate their own 
past, and that the GDR had suddenly become a history to be told by outsiders. In this sense, 
Ostalgie allows memory to assume primacy over history; it elevates the particular above the 
universal, hence its original importance for the east German community – original, because 
Ostalgie has largely been assimilated into mainstream German cultural life.22  
 
Ostwind - a breath of fresh air?  
 
The commercial hijacking of Ostalgie obscured the circumstances that had given rise to the trend, 
and the resulting Ostalgie television shows were less a celebration of east German culture than a 
comical post-mortem. The socio-economic realities facing present-day eastern Germany tend to 
be overshadowed by both these nostalgia narratives and by the popular historical accounts of the 
GDR which focus predominantly on the iniquities of the dictatorship. The decision, then, by ZDF 
and ORB to initiate a series of films that would promote young directors from the east and west 
wishing to represent the lived reality of the east in both feature and documentary films offered a 
palliative to the essentializing tendencies that have characterized the media’s usual approach to 
representing eastern Germany. Although a number of filmmakers have offered realistic accounts 
                                                               
21 Slavoj Zizek, ‘Repeating Lenin’, 1997. Online at: http://www.lacan.com/replenin.htm [Accessed 4.7.2006]. 
22 The release of Wolfgang Becker’s Good Bye, Lenin! (2002) was undoubtedly a major factor in popularizing 
Ostalgie still further. Though not the first film to address or facilitate the east Germans’ celebration of their past, it 
was the first film to enjoy success in both halves of Germany and beyond – Becker’s film was an unprecedented 
international box-office hit. Capitalizing on the vogue for retro fashion, the film offered an original and entertaining 
insight into the early months of social and political transition facing east Germans and, in the process, attempted to 
comment on the east Germans’ idealization of their past, a past that is clearly invented. Good Bye, Lenin! fostered a 
wider interest in east German, that is GDR, culture, and the film’s popularity prompted television channels to 
produce their own Ostalgie  shows, variations of the nostalgia show format popular in much of European television.  
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of the east over the years, these films (financed by regional film- funding boards and generous 
state arts subsidies) received limited distribution, if they received distribution at all, and did not 
always secure the broadcast slots that were guaranteed as part of the Ostwind package. 
Ostwind, which was originally conceived by the Chief Executive of ORB, Hans-Jürgen 
Rosenbauer, owes much to ‘Das Kleine Fernsehspiel’, the influential series established by the 
German public service broadcaster, ZDF, more than forty years ago. This series has long 
championed non-commercial filmmaking in Germany, reaching its critical apogee in the 
seventies, during which time directors associated with New German Cinema were able to take 
advantage of the channel’s progressive attitude towards films that gave voice to the politically 
and socially marginalized.23 The channel’s willingness to support novice directors and projects 
that would otherwise doubtless fail to find the necessary finance has continued, and ‘Das Kleine 
Fernsehspiel’ has been instrumental in providing a platform for directors who have since gone on 
to win awards and critical kudos. 
A dozen films, comprising nine feature films and three documentaries, were made as part 
of the Ostwind series between 1999 and 2003.24 Though the focus was principally on eastern 
Germany, two of the films extend beyond the German border. In Normal People (2001), director 
Oleg Novkovic offers a portrait of life in Belgrade during the war, and the cameras travel as far 
as Russia in Mit Ikea Nach Moskau (2001), Michael Chauvistré’s documentary about two east 
Germans who move to work at the country’s first Swedish furniture store.25 Unusually, most of 
the titles were given a theatrical release and subsequently broadcast on both stations. Despite the 
limited contact with audiences that a run at low-profile film festivals offers and the typically late 
night broadcast slots, the films probably enjoyed greater exposure than would have otherwise 
been the case – assuming that they had ever succeeded in getting the films funded. The choice of 
films that were offered under its rubric reveal a progressively liberal principle, namely to reflect 
                                                               
23 See Thomas  Elsaesser, European Cinema: Face to Face with Hollywood  (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2005), p. 215. 
24 See the Ostwind  website for more information on the series and links to individual productions: 
http://www.zdf.de/ZDFde/inhalt/6/0,1872,1022118,00.html [Accessed 3.6.2006]. 
25 Or, as the channel’s website puts it: ‘junge Regisseurinnen und Regisseure bekamen die Möglichkeit, in 
persönlichen Geschichten über die Veränderungen im Osten Deutschlands und in Europa nach dem Fall des Eisernen 
Vorhangs zu erzählen.’ See http://www.rbb-online.de/_/ostwind/index_jsp/key=teaser_1799097.html [Accessed 
3.6.2006]. 
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and to promote east Germany’s diverse culture, focusing on communities and regions that have 
either been neglected or subjected to reductive accounts by the media.  
The films to be released as part of the Ostwind series would, according to the producers, 
Cooky Ziesche and Annedore von Donop, privilege accounts of ordinary, everyday life in the 
east: 
Die Entscheidung, ausschließlich Geschichten aus dem Osten zu erzählen, gründet sich 
auf dem Wunsch, den historischen Prozess nach dem Fall der Mauer und des Eisernen 
Vorhangs in Filmen festzuhalten. Dabei interessiert uns nicht das “große” politische 
Geschehen, sondern das ganz “normale” Leben in seinen verschiedenen Facetten. 26 
 
Inherent in this vision is a determination to  provide genuine insights into life in areas that seldom 
feature in mainstream accounts. 27 At the same time, the narratives seek to acknowledge the 
diversity of east German culture and to balance what Klusmeyer rightly refers to as the ‘one-
sided, top-down approach toward the East Germans’ that has dominated unification discourse.28 
Whether the series truly achieves this is debatable. Despite similarities in their production 
budgets, visual style and eastern orientation, the twelve films made by young directors (the oldest 
was born in 1957, the youngest in 1973, and many of them were still studying at the celebrated 
film school in Potsdam) are qualitatively inconsistent (though the series won over twenty film 
prizes in all). 
Not all of the films bear out the rather earnest statement of intent outlined by the 
commissioning producers. Befreite Zone (Norbert Baumgarten, 2002), for instance, is a satire set 
in a provincial east German town where the residents’ spirits are raised when the local football 
team recruits a talented Nigerian player whose arrival makes a positive impact not just on the 
team’s scorecards but on the town’s fortunes. While Baumgarten’s film reflects some of the 
contemporary unification issues – racism, regional economic decline, the imposition of west 
                                                               
26 Ziesche and von Donop. 
27 I use mainstream here as a designation for those productions which, adhering to certain commercially successful, 
tried-and-tested principles, generally enjoy bigger budgets. The Ostwind films discussed do not necessarily challenge 
the formal conventions of commercial filmmaking (artistic experimentation with no concern for audience tastes 
rarely receives much financial support from public television production), but their subject matter often runs counter-
current to the mainstream. 
28 Klusmeyer, pp. 527-28. 
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German business practices – the film hardly evidences the ‘firm grip on the historical process’ 
mentioned in Ziesche’s and von Donop’s editorial. The same could be said of Gordian Maugg’s 
Zutaten für Träume (2001), which saw Renate Krößner, one of the most popular actresses in the 
GDR, play a former haute cuisine chef who enters a cooking competition that is ultimately a 
contest between east and west. Maugg, too, includes topical issues in his film – migrant workers, 
neo-Nazis, the east-west antagonism – but resists exploring these issues in any detail. Several of 
the films, however, present more serious considerations of life in the east. Issues of culpability 
and loyalty, central to the unification debate surrounding the role played by the Stasi and the east 
German border guards, are examined in Karsten Laske’s Hundsköpfe (2001), a drama that 
follows a unit of former border guards who are reunited in order to clear an area of the former no-
man’s-land of mines. Other unification issues, such as the problem of negotiating the move from 
one political system to another, are explored in Ostwind films like Berlin is in Germany, which 
offers a practical guide to integration by highlighting two contrasting responses to unification. 
For the former wife of the returning convict, who is now married and living in suburban Berlin, 
complete assimilation is the solution, and she undergoes a kind of cultural ecdysis, blending in 
perfectly with her upwardly mobile surroundings. In contrast, the risks of not integrating are 
made obvious in the film’s characterization of Peter, the luckless individual mentioned above. 
The character’s self-pity, inelegant clothing, and lack of responsibility mark him as the 
stereotypical east German, and the lead character’s future success lies partly in recognizing his 
friend’s mistakes. The narrative is not so crass as to suggest that the east Germans must learn to 
be exactly like their western compatriots, however. Stöhr’s film outlines the dangers of not 
moving on, but it also offers a subtle critique of the west by focusing on the wife’s new milieu in 
which material comfort is linked to a vacuous western culture.29 
For the directors making the final Ostwind films, which, after runs at film festivals and in 
theatres, were broadcast in 2006, the region’s young population is the focus of interest. The series 
producers’ claim that the filmmakers are interested in depicting ‘normal life’ in the east is 
perhaps not quite accurate. The films may be concerned with presenting authentic portraits of 
‘normal life’, but it is the ordinary life of the region’s underclass that is of principle interest here. 
Susanne Irina Zacharias’s Hallesche Kometen (2004) is set among the unemployed in the 
                                                               
29 See Nick Hodgin, ‘Berlin is in Germany and Good Bye, Lenin! Taking Leave of the GDR?’, Debatte: Review of 
Contemporary German Affairs, Vol. 12, No.1  (May 2004 ), 25-46 (pp. 30-34). 
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depressed town of Halle. A neo-Nazi fringe group is the subject of both Franziska Tenner’s 
documentary, No Exit (2003) and Mirko Borscht’s Kombat Sechzehn (2004), while Esther 
Gronenborn’s Adil Geht (2004) considers a community of refugees from the war in Kosovo 
living in the small east German town of Altenburg.  
What these films offer is a differentiated view of the east to those that have hitherto 
prevailed. The films broaden the narrowly imagined eastern community found in mainstream 
accounts. Where the films revisit ground already trodden, the approach is more nuanced. At first 
glance, for example, there is little to distinguish Susanne Irina Zacharias’s debut film, Hallesche 
Kometen, from other post-unification narratives. The themes that are central to Hallesche 
Kometen – unemployment, petty crime, depression, alcoholism, the desire to escape the 
provincial east German environment – were raised in a number of films released in the years 
following the demise of the east German state. The film’s visual composition, the panoramic 
takes of the east’s prefabricated residential flats and the views across the city’s uninspiring 
socialist-era architecture, is by now something of a convention when representing the urban east. 
But where earlier narratives tended towards a cause-and-effect schema, according to which the 
east’s social and psychological problems were seen as a corollary of unification or a legacy of life 
behind the wall, Zacharias’s film, like other recent films, resists this kind of reckoning and 
minimizes reference to either unification or to the east German past. 30 
In keeping with the series producers’ intention that the Ostwind films would offer realistic 
portraits of everyday life in the east, the film strives for the kind of authenticity that critics had 
often found to be lacking in post-unification dramas and which prompted positive comparisons 
with British filmmaking (presumably a reference to the tragic-comedy of Mike Leigh and the 
social realism of Ken Loach). Zacharias’s film pays forensic attention to the humdrum aspects of 
its subjects’ lives. Like many of the Ostwind films, these are lives in the balance. In Hallesche 
Kometen, the young protagonist, Ben, struggles to deal with his own frustrations (in trying to earn 
enough money to travel abroad) while also caring for his father, a depressed, unemployed 
widower. Ben’s father may be seen as one of unification’s victims – many post-1989 narratives 
                                                               
30 For the critic, Raimund Gerz, the film makes use of the ‘Accessoires der Ost-Tristesse’ without allowing them to 
dominate: ‘Diese Impressionen aber sind nicht dominant, sondern bilden nur die Kulisse für die kammerspielartigen 
Szenen’. See ‘Hallesche Kometen. Preisgekrönter Debütfilm um einen Vater-Sohn-Konflikt’, epd-film, 1/2006. 
Online at: http://www.epd.de/epdfilm_neu/33194_39302.htm [Accessed 7.6.2006]. 
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erroneously show men to be unification’s losers when in fact research indicates that it was 
women who have faced the greatest challenges and prejudices during the period of social and 
political transformation – but Zacharias’s film also suggests that he perpetuates his victim status, 
much to the consternation of his son. This is an altogether surprising approach to her 
protagonist’s circumstances, given the sensitivity of the issue. Unemployment is high in eastern 
Germany and has been attributed to various causes, including the mass redundancies that 
followed the downsizing or closure of many businesses after unification (which contributed to the 
east Germans’ sense of injustice), and the east Germans’ alleged reluctance to work (a familiar 
west German complaint).31 But like Berlin is in Germany, Hallesche Kometen promotes the 
notion of individual responsibility, showing how a pro-active approach, as advocated by the son, 
may be a solution to escaping their moribund situation. This does not lead to any of the fanciful 
schemes that offer east Germans a way out in the mainstream post-unification films. Though the 
son is briefly engaged in petty crime – selling black market cigarettes, an occupation typically 
associated with eastern Europeans and Vietnamese – he soon pursues more conventional 
methods, approaching prospective employers, both for him and for his father. 
Filial obligation is an increasingly common trope in contemporary German film, 
especially in those films set in the east. Responsible sons who are determined to help their 
seemingly incapable parents are also be found, for example, in Netto (Robert Thalheim, 2004), 
Das Lächeln der Tiefseefische (Till Endemann, 2005) and Good Bye, Lenin!. With little 
connection to the state in which their parents’ generation was socialized, the sons (but never the 
daughters) act as intermediaries who enable their parents to disinvest themselves of the past and 
to participate in the new society. There is no clear indication that the son’s and father’s situation 
is suddenly about to improve, but the confrontation between the two not only results in a 
resolution of their differences but also indicates a renewed confidence that may ultimately bring 
about a change to their economic circumstances. The films thus avoid both the fairytale ending of 
the mainstream films and the grim tragedy that concluded many of the earlier dramas. 
Generational difference is a theme that emerges also in Esther Gronenborn’s Adil Geht. 
Gronenborn, who came to prominence with alaska.de (2001), her prize-winning film of east 
                                                               
31 Economic disparity is central to the east/west antagonism. The recent introduction of the welfare reform package 
known as ‘Hartz IV’, which seeks to reduce the support given to the long-term unemployed, led to mass 
demonstrations in the east, where this change in policy looked set to affect a considerable portion of the population.  
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Berlin teenage culture, employs a similar lo - fi documentary aesthetic for her Ostwind film. Set 
among a refugee community located since the Kosovan war in the provincial east German town 
of Altenburg, the film likewise uses lay actors, drawn from Turkish, Bosnian and Kosovan Roma 
communities. Though not the only recent German film to delve into post-migrant German 
communities and youth culture (Neko Celik’s Urban Guerillas  (2003), Christian Wagner’s 
Ghetto Kids (2001), or Till Hastreiter’s Status Yo (2003) explore similar milieus), Adil Geht does 
provide a rare insight into the lives of teenagers who are among society’s most marginal figures, 
belonging neither to the established German community nor to the hyphenated post-immigrant 
communities associated with the original ‘Gastarbeiter’ (Turkish-German, Greek-German etc.). 
These refugee families are kept in a state of limbo by the German immigration authorities and 
though they hope to be granted residency rights, they live knowing that they may be repatriated at 
any time.32 For the children of these families who have, to a large extent, been socialized in 
Germany, this transitory existence is particularly difficult. Knowing that they might be sent back 
to their country of origin, with which they have little connection, results in a group solidarity that 
mostly transcends any traditional antagonism between the adolescents of different ethnic 
backgrounds. Though the teenagers are acculturated in German society, facilitated by their 
attendance at a German school where they dress and behave like most of the other kids, they also 
maintain some distance from mainstream German culture. Hip hop provides them with a scene in 
which they are able to practise an identity that is neither German nor non-German. More than a 
counter-cultural scene, hip hop assumes considerable significance for these youths, who are kept 
in a state of flux while the immigration authorities process their claims, for it constitutes, as Andy 
Bennett has suggested, ‘a series of strategies which are worked out and staged in response to 
particular issues encountered in local situations.’33 Accordingly, the break-dance contest at which 
the teenagers plan to perform is less a competition between contesting groups than a venue of 
                                                               
32 The families ’ status in Germany falls under the legal title of ‘Duldung’, or tolerated residence, a title that grants 
only limited residency to asylum seekers and which can be withdrawn at any time, resulting in their deportation. The 
use of lay actors lends validity to the film project, not least because the actors’ real-life biographies are not much 
different from those they portray. Indeed, it took considerable effort by the filmmakers and relevant bodies to prevent 
Ali Biryar, who plays the eponymous lead, from being repatriated during the period of filming. 
33 Andy Bennett, ‘Hip Hop am Main: The Localization of Rap Music and Hip Hop Culture’, Media, Culture & 
Society, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1999), 77-91 (pp. 80-81). 
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conflict between the teenagers and the state – as represented by the police officers and 
immigration agents searching for Adil.34  
Research into hip hop culture has shown that it carries particular significance for 
immigrant and marginalized communities. 35 As in other countries, hip hop in Germany evolved 
from an imitation of the American street sub-culture to a distinctly national product, one that the 
country’s marginalized groups were more easily able to harness and participate in than with other 
musical genres (even if the media initially neglected their involvement, focusing instead on the 
more accessible version advocated by white German rappers). 36 Hip hop’s appeal for Germany’s 
immigrant youth lies, then, in its ‘different, non-German cultural pattern’.37 In that sense, it 
enables otherwise different cultural groups to coalesce, for it creates, as Fatima El-Tayeb has 
observed, ‘a broad forum of expression and exchange between marginalised communities, 
fostering interactions between minorities becoming aware of their similar situation.’38 Certainly, 
this is the case in Adil Geht. Gronenborn’s film shows how hip hop culture provides the teenagers 
of diverse ethnic groups (Kosovans of Albanian (Ashkali) and Roma background) with a means 
of expression that is not only separate from mainstream German culture but alien to their own 
traditiona l way of life, for the teenagers’ musical tastes also marks them as ‘other’ from their own 
culture, which is signalled by the traditional music heard or sung during the scenes set at their 
family homes. At the same time, this sub-culture provides its subjects with a form of cultural 
expression that approximates Bhabha’s notion of a liminal ‘third space’, allowing the adolescents 
to resist simple categorization – they clearly reject both the inclusionary impulses of their 
                                                               
34 It is worth noting that break-dance has its roots in US street gang culture, where it was as much a form of conflict 
resolution as an exhibition of athleticism or choreography. 
35 See Murray Forman and Mark Anthony Neal, That’s the Joint!: The Hip-Hop Studies Reader (New York: 
Routledge, 2002). See also Sabine von Dirke, ‘Hip-Hop Made in Germany: From Old School to the Kanaksta 
Movement’, in German Pop Culture. How American is it?, ed. by Agnes C. Mueller (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2004), pp. 96-113. 
36 See Fatima El-Tayeb, ‘“If You Can’t Pronounce My Name, You Can Just Call Me Pride”: Afro-German Activism, 
Gender and Hip Hop’, Gender & History, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2003), 460-86 (p. 476). 
37 Dietmar Elflein, ‘From Krauts with Attitudes to Turks with Attitudes: Some Aspects of Hip-Hop History in 
Germany’, Popular Music, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1998), 255-65 (p. 257). 
38 See El-Tayeb, p. 477. Gronenborn echoes this point, saying that ‘Viele Jugendliche benutzen den Tanz als Flucht, 
als eine Insel auf der sie Annerkennung und Bestätigung finden, ob sie nun einen Pass haben oder nicht.’ See 
‘Interview mit der Regisseurin Esther Gronenborn’, Adil Geht Press Pack, p. 11. 
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families and any exclusionary tactic s by the German community.39 Possessing the language skills 
and cultural references that their parents lack, they are able to negotiate with the host German 
society represented by its various institutions (schools, authorities, workplace); but they also 
fulfil traditional roles inside the micro-culture of their parental home. More than simple 
recreation, the youth-club environment where they practise their dance routines is an opportunity 
for these teenagers to engage with, and participate in, a culture that is all their own.  
One of the most interesting aspects of Adil Geht is its refusal to bow to issues that 
typically dominate such sub-cultural portraits. Gronenborn’s film avoids reducing the various 
immigrant families to a composite of ‘otherness’ but highlights cultural differences within this 
marginalized multi-ethnic community. The director also eschews the usual antagonists: the 
retinue of skinheads often found in films focusing on migrant and ethnic communities are notable 
by their absence. Instead, the migrant families are put under pressure by German migration and 
residency laws which are exercised by various civil servants. Pressures also exist within the 
wider migrant and refugee communities. While the families from the former Yugoslavia 
recognize the similarity of their status and circumstances, Gronenborn’s film acknowledges the 
real cultural differences between and within these families. For the young generation, the 
memories and experiences of their country of origin have begun to be supplanted by their 
experiences and interaction with German society; similarly, their understanding of their families’ 
customs and conventions is removed from the original context and problematized by newly 
learned codes and values. Gronenborn’s film offers no salutary conclusion, no positive 
denouement. Resisting the kind of last-minute reprieve that might have been offered in a 
mainstream picture, Gronenborn’s film finishes with Adil being forcibly repatriated. The film 
ends with a scene featuring the remaining friends, revolving in a circle as the closing song of the 
soundtrack repeats the phrase, ‘Ich bin deutscher’ met by the refrain ‘Sie sind kein deutscher’. 
Figures alienated from their surrounding community are central, too, to Mirko Borscht’s 
Kombat Sechszehn. But the protagonists in Borscht’s film, which is set in Frankfurt an der Oder, 
close to the German-Polish border, are self-styled outsiders, anti-social figures who provoke and 
threaten those they see as different. The target of their abuse is a newly arrived west German 
from cosmopolitan, multicultural Frankfurt am Main who, as the only ‘foreigner’ in their midst, 
is taunted and bullied – unsuccessfully, as it turns out, since he is a talented Taekwando player. 
                                                               
39 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994). 
  
18 
 
While Borscht’s film might initially confirm popular stereotypes of the east and west 
(xenophobic provincials with a poor economic outlook set against affluent, modern urbanites), 
Kombat Sechszehn is less interested in expanding on these particular issues. Instead, Borscht’s 
film is an attempted exposition of the neo-Nazi milieu and its manifestation within east German 
youth culture. The right-wing scene has attracted other filmmakers in recent years, not least 
Franziska Tenner, whose Ostwind documentary film, No Exit, likewise reports from Frankfurt an 
der Oder, and Neo-Nazis have periodically appeared in post-unification dramas.40 Kombat 
Sechszehn is the first feature film to go beyond the standard representation of these counter-
cultural subversives and to consider in some depth what attracts young east Germans to right-
wing politics, a commitment to meaningful enquiry that was acknowledged by critics, many of 
whom thought the film well- intentioned, if a little clumsy.  
What distinguishes Borscht’s film from other post-unification accounts in which neo-
Nazis appear, is the director’s attempt to imbue the film with a degree of authenticity generally 
lacking in other dramas. For the most part, the neo-Nazis in these films are crudely realized 
characters, usually introduced as either shaven-headed village idiots or menacing figures, and 
fulfilling a narrative role that reveals little about their motivations or circumstances. Kombat 
Sechszehn eschews this kind of representation, seeking instead to provide a more realistic insight 
into this particular sub-culture in a way reminiscent of better-known neo-Nazi dramas, such as 
American History X (Tony Kaye, 1998) and Romper Stomper (Geoffrey Wright, 1992).41 Like 
these films, Kombat Sechzehn hopes to illuminate the reasons for young people’s drift towards 
these marginal groups and advances a number of explanations for its adolescents’ transformation 
                                                               
40 Documentaries include Beruf Neonazi (Wilfried Bonengel, 1993) and Thomas Heise’s two films about radical, 
young east Germans (Stau – jetzt geht's los, 1992, and Neustad:. Stau - der Stand der Dinge, 1994). They are also 
represented in fiction films such as Helke Misselwitz’s Herzsprung (1992) and Bernd Böhlich’s Landschaft mit 
Dornen (1992). 
41 See Bodo Mrozek, ‘Harte Treppe’, Der Tagesspiegel, 11.6.2005. Online at: http://archiv.tagesspiegel.de/ 
archiv/11.06.2005/1869538.asp [Accessed 4.3.2006]. Like these two films, Borscht’s was criticized, though to a 
lesser extent, for its alleged Nazi aesthetic. See Rüdiger Suchsland, ‘Wir sind auch Helden’, Der Tagesspiegel , 
21.1.2005. Online at: http://archiv.tagesspiegel.de/archiv/24.01.2005/1608422.asp [Accessed 9.5.2006]. The film is 
clearly not regarded as a propaganda piece by the German authorities, since the Bundeszentrale für politische 
Bildung (BpB) has produced a booklet designed for pedagogical purposes, something it also did for Hayes’ film. See 
Manfred Rüsel, Kombat Sechzehn. Filmheft  (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2003). 
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from everyday teenagers to neo-Nazis. For some of its members, the attraction of being in such a 
group is to be found in the social, male-orientated world that it represents; for others, it is the 
faction’s ideology (which, as Tenner’s documentary also shows, reveals a shaky grasp of 
history).42 Other factors explaining this Mitläufertum may be cited too: the individuals’ 
subordinate social status, their economically disadvantaged lives, peer group pressure, the 
influence of older figures. These issues, which are mostly absent in other post-unification 
narratives, go some way to rationalizing the teenagers’ conversion without condoning it. The film 
even allows for a rare, sympathetic view of neo-Nazis – or at least one of them, the charismatic 
Thomas. Where his Kamaraden show little understanding of right-wing ideology and are far 
more interested in venting their aggression on the vulnerable individuals that they encounter, he 
is a more even-tempered figure, who recognizes that Georg, the west German newcomer, might 
be a valuable recruit to the right-wing cause, not least because of his martial arts expertise. The 
developing friendship between Thomas and Georg, which bears some homoerotic overtones, 
ultimately threatens the former’s position within the hierarchy and results in a savage beating for 
the east and west German when they try to prevent one of the gang’s assaults.  
Borscht’s film faces greater problems in trying to rationalize his main protagonist’s 
temporary transition from enlightened, modern west German to local skinhead. A combination of 
factors apparently precipitates such a transfer in attitude – his relocation from the west to the east 
and the ensuing sense o f displacement, the potential friendship offered by the gang and, finally, a 
feeling of betrayal brought on by the end of his relationship with Jasmin, an Afro-American-
German girl back in the west. His conversion is ultimately little more than a drastic haircut. 
                                                               
42 The films documenting the neo -Nazi scene were not without their detractors. A jury member on one of the festival 
panels objected to Borscht’s handling of right-wing imagery. Some critics disagreed with Tenner’s No Exit, which is 
a useful companion piece to Kombat Sechzehn , seeing her focus on these individuals’ rather unexceptional lives as a 
failure to address or condemn their politics in a sufficiently robust manner. Tenner follows the banal routines of her 
subjects, following the day -to-day habits of their domestic, professional and social lives. The film thus normalizes 
individuals generally demonized by the German media. In contrast to other documentaries and news items, Tenner’s 
film lets the subjects speak for themselves. Rather than providing a platform for neo-Nazis, this approach engenders 
its own critique, since the political rhetoric consists of the usual clichés, and the individuals are exposed as political 
naïfs who are generally unable to summon any logical or convincing responses when challenged by others. No Exit 
and, to a lesser extent, Kombat Sechzehn, emphasize the ordinariness of these lives, and, in so doing, alter the usual 
image of Neo-Nazis as outré or fringe figures. 
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Finally, his decent, liberal principles prevail, and he and Georg are able to break away from their 
erstwhile peers. Sceptics might accuse Kombat Sechzehn of reinforcing the notion of the 
westerner as the better- informed, morally responsible German, but the film also outlines the east 
German’s capacity for change. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Several of the films showing as part of the Ostwind series reveal a new interest in focusing on a 
young generation of east Germans that has little, if any, connection to the GDR. Accordingly, the 
protagonists’ socio-economic circumstances are no longer viewed explicitly through the prism of 
Germany’s transformation process. Nor do the films adhere to the east/west dialectic that 
commonly reduced the relationship between the two populations to one of colonized and 
colonizers, though this is not to suggest that no east/west tension exists, rather that its coordinates 
may have been recalibrated: for the refugees living in Altenburg, their east German neighbours 
are, of course, westerners. Indeed, while many post-unification films tended to portray a region 
populated by individuals from a similar socio-economic milieu, resulting in a one-dimensional 
view of the east German ‘other’, recent films enable a differentiated picture of east German 
society, one that not only foregrounds the everyday lives of young (teenage and early twenties) 
east Germans but also one that acknowledges the region’s increasingly heterogeneous makeup.  
Increasingly, it is Germany’s vulnerable, socially excluded groups that are central to these films’ 
narratives, and, for the first time, these do not consist only of poor, disenfranchised east Germans, 
but also acknowledge recent arrivals from the east and beyond. 43  
It would be wrong to suggest that the Ostwind series constitutes any ideologically 
grounded opposition to dominant modes of representation. The series producers may assert that 
the films offer a unique take on life in the east, but this ignores the contributions made by other 
independent filmmakers over the years, even if these films did not generally enjoy the exposure 
offered through public service broadcasting. However, the films referred to, and discussed here, 
do represent a shift in discourse, extending the field of vision to the margins and allowing 
audiences some insight into lives that have mostly been ignored. The films do not offer a positive 
                                                               
43 In addition to the films already mentioned, one can point to similar themes and concerns in Netto , Das Lächeln der  
Tiefseefische, and Knallhart  (Detlev Buck, 2005). 
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counter-position of the east, one that cancels out the presence, say, of neo-Nazis, or shifts the 
focus away from unemployment. Nor do they ascribe the region’s problems to the difficulties of 
adapting to life in the Federal Republic or indict the west Germans’ administration of the new 
states. Rather, they offer a multi-perspectival view of the east. In contrast to the earlier social 
dramas, often ‘narcissistic self-reflections without real references to society’, these final Ostwind 
films confront standard representations of the east, acknowledging the region’s diversity, from its 
undesirable representatives to its new arrivals, the old, established residents and the young 
generation.44 
Though less consistent than the producers might think, the significance of the Ostwind 
series should not be underestimated. In articulating those stories that ‘are kept silent and out of 
view rather than actually not existing’, these films represent counter-narratives to commercial 
accounts of the east.45 These more nuanced views of Germany’s diverse communities and 
cultures offer insights into marginalized and de-centred groups and challenge the mainstream’s 
adherence to an exc lusionary narrative of a homogeneous, ethnocentric community.  
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44 Massimo Locatelli. ‘Ghosts of Babelsberg: Narrative Strategies of the Wendefilm’, in Textual Responses to 
German Unification, ed. by C. A. Costabile-Heming, R. J. Halverson and K. A. Foell (Berlin; New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2001), pp. 211-224 (p. 216). 
45 Kathrin Hörschelmann, ‘Breaking Ground - Marginality and Resistance in (Post) Unification Germany’, Political 
Geography, Vol. 20 (2001), 981-1004 (p. 993). 
